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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Mortgages-Foreclosure Sale.-Requirements for Advance
Bids Under Statute
On the tenth day after a trustee's sale of land under foreclosure
of a deed of trust,1 the plaintiff telephoned the clerk's office, twelve
miles distant, making an advance bid and offering to deliver the
requisite deposit immediately. The clerk, as an accommodation to
the plaintiff, authorized the mailing of a cashier's check on that day.
The check was mailed during the afternoon, and arrived in the hands
of the clerk next morning. After the plaintiff's conversation with
the clerk, and on the tenth day, the plaintiff's attorney called at the
clerk's office and offered to give him his own check, but was told that
the bid had already been raised by his principal. Held, sufficient
compliance with the statute2 prescribing advance bids and deposits
securing the bids to be paid to the clerk within ten days after the sale.
There are three recognized doctrines on the effect of advance
bids as a ground for refusal to confirm judicial sales. 3 The English
view, and that representing the weight of authority in the United
States, is that an advance bid is not in itself sufficient ;4 confirmation
by the court generally being required in the absence of gross in-
adequacy of price,5 mistake,6 fraud or other misconduct.7 The in-
termediate view holds that confirmation or resale is within the dis-
cretion of the court.8 The minority group, followed by North Caro-
lina, holds that confirmation will be refused on receipt of a higher
'Clayton Banking Co. v. Green, 197 N. C. 534, 149 S. E. 689 (1929).
'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2591: At any time within ten days after
an executor's, administrator's, or trustee's sale the sale may be reopened by an
advance bid of 10% where the previous bid was $500.00 or less than 5% where
it was greater, and the "same is paid to the clerk." The clerk shall then issue
an order for resale on fifteen days notice.
'Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
"Grattam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. ed. 839 (1885);
Page v. Kress, 80 Mich. 85, 20 Am. St. Rep. 504, 44 N. W. 1052 (1890) ; Wil-
liamson v. Dale, 3 John. Ch. 290 (N. Y. 1819); Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
'To set aside the sale, the bid must be so grossly inadequate as to "shock
the conscience of the court," Rospigliosi v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co., 237
Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916).
'7Mistake, even by the strict majority rule, is held to be a valid ground for
setting aside the sale and ordering resale. In the instant case, granting that
the plaintiff failed tb make his bid within the requirements of the statute, could
not his case be supported on the ground of the clerk's mistake in misrepresent-
ing to him the permissible means of payment?
'Shipe v. Consumer's Service Co., 29 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
'State Bank v. Green, 11 Neb. 303, 9 N. W. 36 (1881) ; State Bank v. Mur-
ray, 84 Kan. 524, 114 Pac. 847 (1911) ; Aurbach v. Wolf, 22 App. D. C. 538
(1903) ; Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 399.
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bid ;9 ahd consequently, that inadequacy of price is sufficient ground
for setting aside the sale, an advance bid being regarded as evidence
of the inadequacy of the former one.' 0
With a view to giving every possible advantage to the mortgagor,
substantial compliance with statutes and terms regulating judicial
sales is well recognized." The statute construed in the principal
case was intended for the protection of the mortgagor where sales
are made under power without a decree of foreclosure by the court.12
This and similar statutes' s covering other phases of judicial sales
have always been construed liberally by our courts. An oral objec-
tion to a partition sale where a written objection was required to be
filed was held to be sufficient compliance ;14 as was an advance bid in
a partition sale made after expiration of the period set out by statute,
but before confirmation of the sale;15 payment of a mistaken amount
demanded by the sheriff was valid redemption from a tax sale;16 on
an advance bid a deposit of two per cent where five was required by
statute was held to be sufficient compliance;I7 the clerk may make
order for delivery of deed after confirmation nu:c pro tunc as of the
' N. C., Pa., W. Va., and in early cases Va. incline to this view. Note(1921) 11 A. L. R. 399; In re Bost, 56 N. C. 482 (1851); Childress v. Hurt, 2
Swan 487 (Tenn. 1852); Todd v. Gallego Mfg. Co., 84 Va. 586, 5 S. E. 676(1888) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 167 (1885) ; Hamilton's Estate, 51 Pa.
58 (1865).
Perry v. Perry, 179 N. C. 445, 102 S. E. 772 (1920).
'In re Baugess, 196 N. C. 278, 145 S. E. 395 (1928) ; Lawrence v. Beck,
185 N. C. 196, 116 S. E. 424 (1923); Wise v. Short, 181 N. C. 320, 107 S. E.
134 (1921) ; Pringle v. Loan Ass'n, 182 N. C. 316, 108 S. E. 914 (1921) ; Mc-
Cormick v. Patterson, 194 N. C 216, 139 S. E. 225 (1927) ; as well, terms of
sale under power as set forth in the instrument must be strictly complied with
by the trustee-vendor, Eubanks v. Becton, 158 N. C. 231, 73 S. E. 1009 (1912) ;
Ferebee v. Sawyer, 167 N. C. 199, 83 S. E. 17 (1914) ; Hogan v. Utter, 175 N.
C. 332, 95 S. E. 565 (1918); Ricks v. Brook, 179 N. C. 204, 102 S. E. 207(1920) ; see 2 WrLTsiz, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed. 1927) §833.
'In sales under decree there was always an equity to decree a resale when
a substantial raise in bid had been deposited in court. There being no such
protection as to mortgages with power of sale, this statute was passed to ex-
tend to mortagors whose property had been foreclosed under power of sale
without decree of foreclosure, the same opportunity of a resale where there has
been an increased bid, Pringle v. Loan Ass'n., supra note 11.
'Partition, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3230; Partition Sales, N. C.
Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3243; Tax Sales, N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919)
§8038.
"McCormick v. Patterson, supra note 11.
'Upchurch v. Upchurch, 173 N. C. 88, 91 S. E. 702 (1917).
" Beck v. Meroney, 135 N. C. 532, 47 S. E. 613 (1904).
'Briggs v. Asheville Developers, 191 N. C. 784, 133 S. E. 3 (1926). But
payment of deposit to trustee instead of clerk held an invalid bid. Newby v.
Gallop, 193 N. C. 244, 136 S. E. 610 (1927).
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original date of sale;18 where the trustee gave a deed prematurely
the title derived was held valid since no injury was caused any in-
terested party.1 9
In the instant case the clerk's exercise of discretion involves what
constitutes actual payment to him, not the time of payment. No
discretion exists to extend the time of payment laid down by the
statute. Neither should the rule laid down in the principal case be
extended to allow the clerk's authorization of mailing from an un-
reasonable distance, nor to allow his appointment of any unreason-
able agency for delivery. Recognition must be given the strong
argument against the North Carolina policy of allowing advance
bids in that it tends to make judicial sales unstable, and chills the
bidding.20 Granting that a liberal interpretation is consonant with
the purpose of the statute itself, in its effort to protect the mortgagor
by such liberality of construction the court should tak6 proper care
that it does not lean backward and thereby defeat its own purpose.
J. G. ADAmS, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Evidence--Parol Agreements to
Vary Liability of an Indorser
In Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc.,' the payee of five
sealed notes brought action on them six years after maturity. The
defendants who were accommodation indorsers fdr the maker (now
insolvent) pleaded the three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff
offered oral evidence that defendants, directors of the corporation,
prior to their indorsement, agreed to "remain liable and responsible
until the notes were paid." Evidence excluded. Affirmed. Held:
that prior oral agreements which change the status of an indorser to
that of a surety are unenforceable. The court assumes that such an
agreement if held valid would impose the liability of co-makers or
sureties on the indorsers who could then plead only the ten year
statute of limitations for sealed notes.2
Lawrence v. Beck, supra note 11.No advance bids were offered during the statutory period, Wise v. Short,
supra note 11; but the clerk has no power to order a resale until an advance bid
has been made, where the clerk prematurely made order for deed to bidder the
order may be revoked and a resale ordered, Hanna v. Carolina Mortgage Co.,
197 N. C. 184, 148 S. E. 31 (1929).
"Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570, 77 S. E. 458 (1913).
198 N. C. 89, 150 S. E. 676 (2) (1929).
'This point was not raised by either of counsel's briefs or by the court.
The plaintiff counsel sought to have the parol agreement enforced and thereby
